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DEDUCTIBILITY OF BUSINESS EXPENSES: THE
EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
CONTROVERSY

by

Richard J. Kraus *
Vincent R. Barrella**

INTRODUCTION
A person who performs services as an employee may
deduct unreimbursed expenses in the performance of those
services. The miscellaneous itemized deductions section of
Form 1040, Schedule A, permits a list of those deductions on
that form or on an attached document. These itemized
deductions, however, are subject to certain limitations: they
must exceed 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income
(AGI)1; and the taxpayer may have alternative minimum tax
requirements.2
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On the other hand, a person who performs services as a
statutory employee within any of four categories including
drivers, full-time life insurance sales agents, work-at-home
individuals and full-time traveling salesperson3 or an
independent contractor may deduct business expenses through
the use of Form 1040, Schedule C, without any limitation
imposed on the miscellaneous itemized deductions and without
the adverse ramifications of the alternative minimum tax with
respect to those deductions.
This article examines the advantages and disadvantages
of requirements to use Schedule A or Schedule C, the
definitions of common law employee and independent
contractor and a number of recent cases which assist the
professional tax counselor in formulating a plan of advice for
clients. These clients include workers in the following
businesses: teaching, building and construction, trucking,
computers, automobiles, attorneys, taxi cab drivers and
salespersons. The article concludes with a specific plan for
assisting clients who face the tax dilemma of working as
consultants or advisors for businesses.
ADVANTAGES
STATUS

AND

DISADVANTAGES

OF

TAX

While independent contractors and statutory employees
may use Schedule C to claim business deductions, these
persons will be subject to pay self-employment tax upon the
profits gained from the business, if the party for whom they
work has not already paid those taxes.4 On the other hand, as
already indicated, common law employees are subject to the
2% AGI limitation. The range of deductions on Schedule C,
however, noticeably list expenses such as advertising, fees,
contract labor, depletion, employee benefits, insurance,
mortgage payments, professional fees, office expenses, rents,
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repairs, supplies, utilities and wages which are not contained
on Schedule A. This schedule emphasizes unreimbursed
employee expenses such as job travel, job education, vehicle
expenses and meals and entertainment, which may also be
claimed on Schedule C.5 A worker usually prefers to claim
independent contractor or statutory employee status so as to be
able to deduct a wide range of expenses associated with the
worker’s business activity.
DEFINITIONS:
COMMON
LAW
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

EMPLOYEE;

The Code, as has been noted above, explicitly defines
and describes a statutory employee as an individual who
usually belongs within one of four categories: driver, life
insurance sales agent, home worker, full-time traveling
salesperson. Statutory employees receive a W-2 form on which
their status is noted.6 This article concentrates upon the
distinction between common law employee and independent
contractor.
Common Law Employee
Although the Internal Revenue Code assesses income
tax against taxpayers who perform services as an employee, the
Code nowhere defines the term “employee” so that the
common law rules apply to the definition.7 Many specific facts
and circumstances assist in the determination of the employee
status. The degree of control exercised over the employee by
the employer or principal is paramount; but the cases also
weigh other relevant factors: worker investment in the work
facility, the possibility of individual profit or loss, payment to
the worker by the job or by the time, the power of the principal
to discharge an individual without the payment of any damages
other than back wages and other contractually agreed amounts,
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the principal’s regular business activity, the permanency of the
work relationship, the perception of the parties about the
relationship and the provision of employee benefits.8

Independent Contractor
The common law and statutes define an “independent
contractor” as one who works for another, but the independent
contractor has the right to control the means and methods of
completing the work requested. The principal only has the right
to control or direct the result of the work and may refuse to pay
if not reasonably satisfied.9
The Tax Court often examines the substance of the
relationship between the principal and the one who is working.
It does not matter if the individual is employed part-time rather
than full-time and no distinction is made between classes of
employees so that officers of corporations, managers and other
supervisory personnel are all employees. The only exception to
this treatment concerns temporary leased staffing services that
provide secretaries, nurses, and other trained workers on a
temporary basis – these leased employees work for the staffing
services who supply them.
In addition to statutory employees, furthermore, the
Code lists statutory non-employees such as direct sellers, real
estate agents and certain companion sitters employed on a fee
basis and who work under a written contract designating them
as non-employees. It should be noted that direct sellers include
sellers of consumer products from their own homes or places of
business, sellers engaged in delivering or distributing
newspapers and others who earn income based on the
productivity of their direct sales.10
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CONTROVERSIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PLAN
Many Tax Court cases have applied the statutory
criteria to determine the tax status of a worker. Court
applications concentrate upon controversies which present
opportunities to understand and appreciate the necessary
complexity of Code rules and to frame a plan of action for tax
clients.
Rosato v. Commissioner11
In 1975 Thomas Rosato signed a contract with the O.C.
Tanner Company to work as a salesperson for its products and
services which assist companies to develop programs for
recognizing and rewarding their employees. Mr. Rosato
worked the New York City area sales territory in accord with
this agreement which designated him as the company’s
employee, subject to an anti-competition clause, who was to
devote his full time and best efforts to the service of the
company. Rosato was permitted to participate in Tanner’s
retirement plan and its medical insurance and group term life
insurance plans. Additionally, during the tax year 2006, at issue
in this case, Rosato managed Tanner’s regional office in the
city; he supervised salespersons, secretaries and other
personnel whom Tanner had hired. Rosato was required to, and
did, attend company meetings and training sessions and he was
often present at the company’s New York City office, but
Tanner considered him to be an at-will employee.
The agreement noted, however, that Rosato was to pay
all expenses in excess of his expense allowance and would not
be reimbursed for these expenses. Tanner did not set Rosato’s
work hours or instruct him when to work and he was permitted
to perform some of his sales work from his home. Rosato paid
a portion of his office rent, half the cost of his personal
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secretary and of his own personal assistant; Rosato also paid
commissions to other Tanner salespersons from his own
commissions. Rosato did not receive reimbursements from
Tanner for all of the business expenses which he reported on
his monthly regional expense report, including phone, utility,
postage, customer entertainment, office supplies and meal
expenses.
For all of the tax years prior to 2006, Rosato had filed
Form 1040 with Schedule A attached requesting deductions for
unreimbursed employee expenses. For the 2006 tax year,
however, Rosato left Form 1040, line 7, “Wages, salaries, tips,
etc.” blank and used Schedule C, “Profit of loss from
Business,” in order to report gross receipts and sales of
$468,378. Rosato decided upon this plan of action even though
he had received a Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement from
Tanner which had not checked the “statutory employee” box
on the form’s face.
The court agreed with the IRS determination that
Rosato was a common law employee despite Rosato’s
arguments that he was either a statutory employee or an
independent contractor.12
The court reasoned that an individual taxpayer may
qualify as a statutory employee only if the individual is not a
common law employee. The court then used the series of
criteria mentioned above to determine Rosato’s status:
Control: The Company exercised a good deal of control over
Rosato: he was required to attend sales meetings, maintain an
office presence and not compete; superiors at Tanner
supervised his work.
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The Perception of the Parties: Tanner and Rosato entered a
written contract in 1975 which was superseded by a Golden
Rule principle oral agreement in 1984, which honored the
terms of the written agreement. Both the written and oral
agreements named Rosato as an employee with specific
salesperson’s duties and as a worker who would receive Form
W-2 at the end of the work year.
Worker Investment in the Work Facility: Rosato had to
contribute to office rent and to the payment of office workers,
but this factor must be weighed against other determinants. In
addition, the court observed that there were no detailed terms
for this arrangement and that it was Rosato’s personal decision
to incur additional costs by hiring a secretary and
administrative assistant. Rosato did claim that he worked from
his home on occasion, but he never presented any evidence of
expenses to establish a home office.
The Possibility of Individual Profit or Loss: Rosato was not
paid a wage but was awarded commissions; additionally,
because he shared expenses with Tanner he did risk a net loss if
his profits did not exceed those expenses.
The Provision of Employee Benefits: The contract between
Rosato and Tanner included retirement plan participation,
medical and life insurance plans and unemployment insurance;
Rosato obviously received benefits and, despite indications of
an independent contractor status, the reception of these benefits
strongly indicates an employer-employee relationship.
Payment to the Worker by the Job or by the Time: The court
observed that Rosato’s pay came from the commissions for his
sales activity and was not based upon time; Rosato, in fact,
could set his own time schedule.
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The Principal’s Regular Business Activity: The court relied
strongly upon the fact that Rosato was engaged solely in the
regular business activity of Tanner and that he could not
compete with them in any similar business; such a fact strongly
indicates his employee status.
The Permanency of the Work Relationship: The facts indicate
that Rosato had been working for Tanner since 1975; thirtyone years of employment, of receipts of W-2 forms for that
entire time indicated to the court that the work relationship was
quite permanent.
The Power of the Principal to Discharge an Individual: Tanner
considered Rosato to be an employee at will and retained the
right to discharge him at any time; this fact again strongly
indicates an employer-employee relationship.
Feaster v. Commissioner13
A second Tax Court decision held that an accountant
acted as a common law employee rather than an independent
contractor. Daniel Feaster could not use Schedule C but was
required to list the unreimbursed business expenses on
Schedule A.
From 2002 to 2009, Feaster performed field auditing
services for William Langer and Associates of South Carolina.
He had provided his employer with a completed W-4 form,
Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate, and W-2s had
been issued to him throughout his time of employment.
Feaster’s employee job description set time limits on the
performance of his work, its quality, his customer charges, his
progress reports and his submission of weekly itineraries.
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His job description indicated that cases were to be
completed and that federal, state, county and city taxes would
be deducted from the billable hours for which he was paid.
During the 2006 tax year, at issue in this case, Langer paid
Feaster $29,650 in wages and withheld federal income, Social
Security and Medicare tax; Feaster received reimbursement of
$6,764 for his expenses.
Even though he received his regular W-2 form, Feaster
filed his 2006, Form 1040, federal income tax return with a
Schedule C attached; Feaster claimed that he was an
independent contractor entitled to deductions for car, office,
travel and meal and home office expenses. In an explanatory
note concerning the forms and schedules filed, Feaster
indicated that his self-employment tax had been partially paid
by one of his clients, Langer, and that that same client deducted
the necessary Social Security and Medicare tax.
The Internal Revenue Service issued a notice of
deficiency against Feaster indicating that he was neither a
statutory employee nor an independent contractor.
The Tax Court in this case closely followed the
reasoning of the Rosato decision. After noting that Feaster did
not claim he was a statutory employee, the court indicated that
Langer’s control over Feaster’s work sufficed: the accountant’s
job description, the acceptance of employer guidelines
concerning case time limits, frequency of submissions, charges
to the customer, submission of itineraries and case closings
signified constant employer supervision. Feaster had indicated
that he was not very good about communicating with Langer
and Langer never objected to this failure. But the employer had
either controlled, or had power to control, its employee.
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The other elements used to determine whether or not
Feaster qualified as an independent contractor also clearly
indicated that he was a common law employee under the
control of the parties. The perception of the parties was clearly
indicated in the employment agreement under the issuance of
Form W-2 during the entire course of Feaster’s employment.
Although Feaster had to supply his own internet service and at
times worked out of his home, his investment in the business
was not considerable because he was reimbursed for hotel,
meal and vehicle mileage and he had no possibility of
individual profit or loss. Langer also provided health insurance,
life insurance and retirement plan benefits which were
available even if not used by Feaster. Feaster also received an
hourly wage subject to an increase or decrease depending upon
his performance – he was paid by the time he worked, and not
by the cases he completed. Feaster’s work was part of the
principal’s regular business and the accountant worked for an
extended period of time so that the employment was
considered to be permanent. In addition, Langer, the principal,
possessed the power to discharge Feaster at any time.
The taxpayer, then, had the obligation to use Schedule
A for the declaration of unreimbursed business expenses and
did not have the right to use Schedule C in order to amplify
those expenses.
Robinson v. Commissioner14
The Robinson decision and the Hathaway15
determination, which follows, held that a college professor and
a traveling sales representative for a clothing manufacturer
could properly be designated as independent contractors. Both
of these individuals, then, could use the expanded benefits for
the declaration of business expenses available under Schedule
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C, but were obligated to pay self-employment and other taxes
associated with such designation.
Robinson worked as a full time criminal justice
professor for Rowan University, located in southern New
Jersey. At the same time he held a position at Temple
University in Philadelphia as an adjunct professor: he was a
vocational instructor in its Criminal Justice Training Program,
a non-credit course of studies required by Pennsylvania state
law for Pennsylvania police officers and other criminal justice
personnel. Robinson was not responsible for managing the
enrollment of his classes, but at the same time bore no risk of
loss for under enrollment, nor the possibility of earning a
profit. Topics he taught were mandated by the State of
Pennsylvania; Temple supplied Robinson with those topics, but
Robinson many times wrote or edited the entire curriculum
which then became the property of Temple University.
From 1985 to 1996 Temple treated Robinson as an
independent contractor and supplied him with Form 1099MISC Miscellaneous Income statements for his income tax
return. After this time Temple began to treat Robinson as an
employee and report his income on Form W-2. Robinson
requested the university to treat him as an independent
contractor, but the university refused.
Temple did not supply Robinson with an office and
Robinson completed his Temple assigned work in his home
office. Prior to the tax year 2004 Robinson had filed Form
1040 with a Schedule C attached; in a dispute with the Internal
Revenue Service about one of these prior tax returns, the
Service had stipulated that Robinson had no deficiency for the
tax year in issue, without determining that Robinson was an
independent contractor. For the tax years 2004 and 2005
Robinson continued to file Form 1040 with a Schedule C

39 / Vol 31 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

attached, but did not file the 2004 return until 4-19-07 and the
2005 return until 6-13-07.
On the 2004 Schedule C, Robinson and his market
company manager wife claimed income of $1,795 and
expenses totaling $25,164 relating to Robinson’s services to
Temple. On the 2005 Schedule C, Robinson and his wife
claimed income of $4,045 and expenses totaling $26,825 from
Robinson’s work at Temple.16 In late 2007, the IRS mailed
letters to Robinson and his wife in order to indicate that their
2004 and 2005 tax returns would be examined.
At the examination, Robinson provided no
documentation substantiating his reported expenses, although
Robinson did continue to indicate that he should be treated as
an independent contractor. The Service determined that
Robinson was a common law employee but the Tax Court
reversed this determination.
As in all decisions dealing with this matter, the Tax
Court examined a number of relevant factors to determine
whether Robinson acted as an independent contractor in his
instructor work for Temple University. These same nine factors
were discussed in detail in the Rosato decision above: degree
of control; perception of the parties; work facilities investment;
individual profit or loss; employee benefits; payment by job or
by time; regular business activity; permanency of relationship;
power to discharge.
The court observed that an adjunct professorship such
as Robinson’s position at Temple usually involves the
university assignment of the courses to be taught and where to
teach them. Robinson’s duties at Temple, however, were
similar to other situations17 in which schools hired professors
to teach in somewhat independent non-credit programs:
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Robinson’s work as a vocational instructor in a non-credit
criminal justice training program. Robinson wrote course
materials and syllabi for topics supplied by the state of
Pennsylvania, which paid Temple University for the courses.
The university did set time deadlines for the completion of the
work, but did not exercise control over how Robinson
completed the work. The control test suggests that Robinson is
an independent contractor.
The perception of the parties clearly indicated that
Temple University considered Robinson a common law
employee when it began to issue him W-2 forms beginning in
1996; but Robinson had formally been treated as an
independent contractor and contended that he continued to
operate independently. In addition, the university did not
provide Robinson with any office space in which to write and
update course materials so that Robinson’s work facilities
investment could have included a home office. Robinson’s
individual profit or loss would stem not only from the
enrollment success of the courses which he taught but also
from the expert testimony and other criminal justice training
course opportunities which would result from his work.
Robinson also received no employee benefits from Temple,
reinforcing his independent contractor status. Although
Robinson was paid by the hour for his teaching duties, his fee
for writing suggests an independent contractor relationship
with Temple. Since the university is not a police training
academy, Robinson’s work of teaching non-credit courses to
police officers through contracts with the state of Pennsylvania
is not an essential part of Temple’s regular business. Although
Robinson taught in the criminal justice training program for
many years, his employment during the tax years 2004 and
2005 were minimal and the relative permanence of the work
relationship is also arguably minimal. Because Robinson’s
contracts with Temple were not provided, it is difficult to
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determine whether or not the principal could discharge its
alleged employee. Several letters during 2004 and 2005,
however, indicate that Robinson was hired by the university
separately for individual jobs during each year. Temple’s
recourse, therefore, would be to not hire him for future
projects, but the university would not have the power to
discharge him in the midst of his duties.
Despite his status as an independent contractor,
however, Robinson’s Schedule C claims for expenses were not
allowed due to his tremendously inadequate record keeping.
Robinson provided no receipts or invoices, but only some
cancelled checks and credit card statements which did not give
any details about the items purchased or the expenses incurred
for other matters.
Due to his inaccurate filings, Robinson was held
responsible for accuracy related penalties under IRC Sec.
6662(a).18
Hathaway v. Commissioner19
Hathaway began working as a traveling sales
representative in 1969. During the tax years 1989 and 1990, the
years in issue in this case, Hathaway worked for The Apparel
Group, Ltd. (TAG). TAG manufactured clothing and its
wholesale distribution and retail sale. Hathaway assisted in the
distribution of men’s clothing to retail customers during fall
and spring sales seasons. Hathaway and twenty-two other sales
representatives were experienced professionals, most of whom
had been working for TAG for more than twenty years.
Each representative had his own exclusive territory. If a
sales representative made a sale outside of the assigned
territory, the sales representative to whom the territory was
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assigned would receive the commission. Early in 1990 and
during the tax years in question, Hathaway’s sales territory
included North Carolina, South Carolina, Wyoming and parts
of Minnesota; he traveled throughout these this territory but
also maintained showrooms where he solicited sales.
TAG gave no sales training to Hathaway. He and the
other representatives used their own creativity and experience.
They changed their methods and used their own business
judgment to effectuate sales and to schedule their time. In
addition, TAG provided no customer leads nor were the
representatives required to report on leads to TAG. TAG did
have two sales meetings each year but did not require the
representatives to attend. This company’s sales procedure
manual detailed ways in which orders were to be placed with
TAG and did request representatives to submit their schedules,
but these provisions were not followed; the manual also
reserved sales cancellation rights to TAG, but TAG always
accepted the representatives recommendations in this regard.
Hathaway communicated with TAG minimally
throughout the time of his work for the company: he sent his
orders on a scratch pad which were then documented on TAG
forms. Credit reports were required but no other type of report
was used. Otherwise, Hathaway reported to TAG on an
irregular basis. He spoke by phone from time to time to the
company’s national sales manager, who did have final approval
when a special sales arrangement was made with a major
company.
TAG paid its representatives on a commission basis and
permitted a draw against the previously earned commission’s
reserve. TAG issued Forms W-2 to Hathaway in the amounts
of $102,837.28 in 1989 and $129,283.05 for 1990; federal
income taxes and Social Security (FICA) taxes were withheld.
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Hathaway also participated in the TAG pension plan and the
company provided him with disability, life and medical
insurance benefits.
Hathaway’s expenses for the tax years in question were
considerable: he and other representatives had to pay their own
travel, lodging, telephone and food expenses; a portion of his
moving expenses, a percentage of advertising expenses and for
any other materials besides order forms, swatch cards and
preaddressed envelopes. Hathaway spent approximately $2,000
per year on the tools of his trade such as sample cases, business
cards and stationery.
Hathaway also had to maintain his own business
quarters, one in his home in Iowa and the other in a Minnesota
mall. The business quarters included an office space with desk,
computer, printer, bookshelf system, fax machine, copying
machine and filing cabinets. His quarters also had a showroom
with display tables and full glass racks to exhibit TAG
merchandise. Hathaway also had to employ order writers and
people to assist him at apparel shows.
If the costs of Hathaway’s work in soliciting sales were
greater than the commissions generated then Hathaway would
have operated at a loss; he would also have suffered a loss as
the result of his guaranteeing the credit of a purchaser on an
account, which he did from time to time at the request of the
company.
In addition, during 1989 and 1990, Hathaway handled
noncompeting merchandise for a glove company for which he
received commissions. Even if Hathaway were terminated by
the company, he would retain commissions on eighty-five
percent of unshipped orders. TAG would retain the other
fifteen percent to cover the costs of orders that may later be
cancelled for credit or other reasons.
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The Tax Court held that Hathaway was an independent
contractor in 1989 and 1990 and had the right to use Form
1040 Schedule C; he would not, however, be subject to
unemployment taxes because of the amounts already paid by
TAG.
The court reasoned that a taxpayer’s independent
contractor or common law employee designation is a question
of fact which must be determined in accord with the nine
criteria already mentioned. The opinion is remarkable for
explicitly indicating which of the criteria argue for independent
contractor or common law employee status.
TAG’s degree of control over Hathaway was indicated
as the single most important factor in determining Hathaway’s
independent contractor status. The court had to consider not
only what actual control was exercised but what right of
control practically existed. The court concluded that TAG did
not control, nor have the right to control, Hathaway’s actions:
means or results of solicited sales; sales training; sales leads or
sales reports. The statements in the sales procedure manual
were “toothless”20 as none of the procedures described in it
were ever enforced, except for certain requirements about the
placing and cancellation of orders. The TAG national sales
manager supervision requirement, furthermore, was so limited
and rare as to be inconsequential: it came into effect only when
a special sales negotiation occurred with major companies.
The court also rejected TAG’s contention that the assignment
of exclusive sales territories amounted to control as far as the
sales activity itself was concerned.
The other criteria received a briefer treatment. The perception
of the parties, gleaned from the evidence of Tax Court
testimony indicated that Hathaway and sometimes TAG itself
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considered Hathaway as an independent contractor or
independent agent. But this testimony is contradicted by the
fact that Hathaway used Form 1040 Schedule A for many years
and that TAG issued Forms W-2 and withheld taxes from his
commissions. The court concluded that the bulk of the
evidence points to the perception that the parties considered
themselves as in an employer-employee relationship. The work
facilities and sales materials and equipment investments were
so substantial, relative to TAG’s reimbursement, that the court
had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that this criterion
indicated Hathaway’s independent contractor status. As already
indicated in the factual description of his work, Hathaway’s
individual opportunities for profit or loss included nonreimbursement for order losses from merchandise which could
not be shipped and losses from guaranteeing the credit of a
customer who failed to pay. The evidence once again indicated
that Hathaway could claim independent contractor status. TAG
did provide a pension plan, disability, life and medical
insurance benefits. Such provisions support a conclusion that
Hathaway was an employee. The court never explicitly dealt
with the payment by job or by time criterion, but it is quite
obvious from the facts that Hathaway received commissions
from sales jobs completed rather than from time spent in
negotiating those sales – a factor that would indicate
independent contractor rather than common law employee
status. The court did observe that Hathaway’s activity is
certainly an integral or regular part of TAG’s regular business
activity; this factor, the court concluded, would again support a
determination of Hathaway’s status as an employee. Since
Hathaway had worked for TAG since 1969, the permanency of
his relationship with TAG would indicate his employee status.
The court finally observed that TAG’s power to discharge
Hathaway and Hathaway’s right to leave TAG’s employment
created an employment at will. TAG’s right, however, does not
clearly indicate employee status because, from the context,

2014 / Deductibility / 46

TAG would probably have the same right to discharge an
independent contractor. This criterion, then, has little impact
upon a determination of status.
The current analysis of the Hathaway case, then,
indicates that four criteria (control, investment, profit/loss, and
job/time) argued for independent contractor status and four
criteria (perception, benefits, regular business, and
permanency) supported common law employee status. The
power to discharge criterion was deemed inconclusive by the
court.21
CONCLUSION: A PLAN OF ACTION
The Internal Revenue Code, IRS publications and the
four decisions described above will enable the tax practitioner
to plan procedures for the practitioner’s benefit and for the
benefit of the tax client.
The tax practitioner will receive benefit from
acquaintance with code provisions concerning the additions
and penalties for late and inaccurate returns; from IRS
publications including Publication 15-A concerning the criteria
used to determine the elements and examples of independent
contractors, common law employees, statutory employees and
statutory non-employees; from the Tax Court decisions which
richly describe the application of the nine criteria to a number
of professions including accountants, instructors and traveling
sales representatives.
Tax clients, including business consultants or advisors,
will receive benefit from tax professional software and other
means of communication which assist them to adequately
judge the need for professional counsel; to keep work records
by way of computer and other media in day-to-day journals of
business activity; to apply the nine criteria properly, especially
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in questions of control, perceptions of the parties by way of
written agreement and issuance of W-2 forms, and potential for
profit and loss.
ENDNOTES
1

IRC Section 62(a)(2); Section 63(a),(d); Section 67(a),(b); Section 162(a).
IRC Section 55(a). The alternative minimum tax requires that corporations
and individuals pay a certain minimum which would include the greater
amount of the regular tax of the tentative minimum tax at 26% of the first
$175,000 and 28% on all taxable excess. Section 56(b)(1)(A) provides that
in computing Alternative Minimum Taxable Income, no deduction will be
allowed for miscellaneous itemized deductions.
3
IRC Section 3121(d)(1),(3) defines a statutory employee as any (1) any
officer of a corporation; or (2) any individual who, under the usual common
law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship,
has the status of an employee; or (3) any individual (other than an
individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs
services for remuneration for any person (A) as an agent-driver or
commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable
products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages (other than milk), or
laundry or dry-cleaning services, for his principal; (B) as a full-time
salesman; (C) as a home worker performing work, according to
specifications furnished by the person for whom the services are performed,
on materials or goods furnished by such person which are required to be
returned to such person or a person designated by him; or (D) as a traveling
or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver,
engaged upon a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of, and the
transmission to, his principal (except for side-line sales activities on behalf
of some other person) of orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or
operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar establishments for
merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business operations; if the
contract of service contemplates that substantially all of such services are to
be performed personally by such individual.
4
Daniel Feaster v Commissioner, TC Memo 2010-157, 2010 Tax Ct.
Memo LEXIS 194. Feaster argued that he was an independent contractor
whose self employment tax has been paid by the business for whom he
provided auditing services.
2
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5

IRS website at www.irs.gov Even common law employees may itemize
job travel expenses for travel from home to a site other than the employee’s
usual place of business.
6
IRS Publication 15-A – Employer’s Supplemental Tax Guide, p.5.
7
Thomas Rosato, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2010-39, 2010 Tax Ct.
Memo LEXIS 40, for a treatment of the common law employee definition;
this treatment appears in many Tax Court and other cases treating the
employee status.
8
IRS Publication 15-A – Employer’s Supplemental Tax Guide, pp.7, 8;
Weber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378 (19940, aff’d, 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir.
1995).
9
Donald T. Robinson, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-99, 2011
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 97; 1 Restatement of Agency, 220 (1958).
10
IRS Publication 15-A – Employer’s Supplemental Tax Guide, p.6.
11
TC Memo 2010-39.
12
Thomas Rosato, et ux. v. Commissioner, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 40
at 9-10. An individual qualifies as a statutory employee under section
3121(d)(3) only if the individual is not a common law employee pursuant to
section 3121(d)(2). Section 3121(d) defines “employee”, in pertinent part,
as follows:
(2) any individual who, under the usual common law rules
applicable in determining the employer-employee
relationship, has the status of employee; or
(3) any individual (other than an individual who is an
employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs services
for remuneration for any person—
(D) as a traveling or city salesman, other than
as an agent-driver or commission-driver,
engaged upon a full-time basis in the
solicitation on behalf of, and the transmission
to, his principal (except for side-line sales
activities on behalf of some other person) of
orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors,
or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other
similar establishments for merchandise for
resale or supplies for use in their business
operations;
if the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of such services
are to be performed personally by such individual; except that an individual
shall not be included in the term “employee” under the provisions of this
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paragraph if such individual has a substantial investment in facilities used in
connection with the performance of such services (other than in facilities for
transportation), or if the services are in the nature of a single transaction not
part of a continuing relationship with the person for whom the services are
performed;
13
TC Memo 2010-157.
14
TC Memo 2011-99.
15
Paul E. Hathaway, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-389, 1996
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 409
16
The Robinson decision concerns the income tax status of both Robinson
and his wife, but this article concentrates upon Robinson because the Tax
Court did find that Robinson was an independent contractor, whereas his
wife was held to be a common law employee. Since this article has already
examined two decisions which determined that the taxpayer was a common
law employee, the portion of the Robinson opinion dealing with Robinson’s
marketing company manager wife is omitted.
17
Reece v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1992-335, 1992 Tax Ct. Memo
LEXIS 358, where a full time university professor (a common law
employee for his full time work) acted as a seminar instructor for an
executive education program. For this work, Reece was held to be an
independent contractor because he designed, led and taught the non-credit
program, even though the program occurred in classrooms supplied by the
university.
18
2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 97 at 42-43.
19
TC Memo 1996-389.
20
1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 409 at 23.
21
The Hathaway Tax Court, in endnote 7, noted that the Service requested
that benefits provided by TAG to Hathaway should be taxable as income to
him if the court determined that Hathaway was an independent contractor;
this contention however, was not properly pleaded and was not considered
by the court.

